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INTRODUCTION
There has been a lot of talk about post-racialism since the 2008 election of
Barack Obama as the first black President of the United States. Some have
argued that the Obama election illustrates the evolution of the United States
from its unfortunate racist past to a more admirable post-racial present in which
the problem of invidious racial discrimination has largely been overcome.1
Others have argued that the Obama election illustrates only that an extraordinar-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2010, Girardeau A. Spann. I would like
to thank James Forman, Jody Franklin, Steven Goldberg, Patricia King, Richard Lazarus, Mitt Regan,
Mike Seidman, and David Vladeck for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this Essay.
Research for this Essay was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Court Choice Pushes Issue of “Identity Politics” Back to Forefront, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2009, at A20 (discussing claim that the Obama election “was supposed to usher in a
new post-racial age”); Krissah Thompson, 100 Years Old, NAACP Debates Its Current Role, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2009, at A3 (quoting historian David Garrow’s suggestion that the election of President
Obama has marked the end of the traditional civil rights era by signifying “the complete inclusion of
black people at all levels of politics”); id. (reporting Professor Darren Hutchinson’s suggestion that we
are now in a period of “racial exhaustion” when “[a] lot of people are tired of talking about race” and
“[t]hey have to find a new language for dealing with these issues”); Jeffrey Toobin, Comment: Answers
to Questions, NEW YORKER, July 27, 2009, at 19–20 (noting that the Obama election has been invoked to
argue that we have now achieved a level playing field that precludes need for remedial racial measures).
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President was able to overcome the persistent discriminatory racial practices
that continue to disadvantage the bulk of less fortunate racial minority group
members in the United States.2
However, both perspectives fail to engage the feature of race in the United
States that I find most significant. Race is relentlessly relevant. Racial differ-
ences are so socially salient that racial considerations necessarily influence
many of the decisions that we make. Even when racial considerations are tacit
or unconscious, the influence of race is still exerted through the reflex habit of
deferring to white interests in the belief that such deference is racially neutral.
But it is not. The possibility of actual colorblind race neutrality is simply an
option that does not exist.
Nevertheless, the culture remains committed to an abstract principle of racial
equality, which would be offended by a frank recognition of the role that race
inevitably plays in the allocation of societal benefits and burdens. Accordingly,
the culture must find some way to mediate the tension that exists between its
race-neutral rhetorical aspirations and its race-based operational behavior. The
claim that United States culture has now achieved a post-racial status can best
be understood as an effort to serve that function. By conceptualizing contempo-
rary culture as post-racial, we can camouflage the role that race continues to
play in the allocation of resources. However, masking the relevance of race does
not serve to eliminate it. Rather, the post-racial claim ultimately serves to
legitimate the practice of continued discrimination against racial minorities.
The Supreme Court has always been complicit in the practice of sacrificing
racial minority interests for the benefit of the white majority. In its more
infamous historical decisions, such as Dred Scott,3 Plessy,4 and Korematsu,5 the
2. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1 (suggesting that nomination of then-Judge Sotomayor for the
Supreme Court shows that we have not yet reached post-racial age); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Gives
Fiery Address at N.A.A.C.P. 100th Anniversary Celebration, N.Y TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A16
(discussing President Obama’s address at the NAACP 100-year anniversary convention, where he
stated that racial discrimination continues to exist despite civil rights gains); Krissah Thompson, On
Race and Law Enforcement, WASH. POST, July 23, 2009, at A4 (discussing President Obama’s statement
that racially charged arrest of Henry Louis Gates illustrates that racial profiling still exists); Krissah
Thompson & Cheryl W. Thompson, After Arrest, Cambridge Reflects on Racial Rift: Forum To Explore
Deep-Seated Issues, WASH. POST, July 26, 2009, at A1 (claiming that Gates arrest illustrates continued
existence of deep-seated racial tensions); Krissah Thompson & Cheryl W. Thompson, Obama Speaks of
Blacks’ Struggle, WASH. POST, July 17, 2009, at A1 (same); Toobin, supra note 1 (rejecting claim that
Obama election has leveled playing field in way that now precludes need for remedial racial measures);
see also Henry Louis Gates, Jr., A Conversation with William Julius Wilson on the Election of Barack
Obama, 6 DU BOIS REV. 15, 20–21 (2009) (disputing post-racial claim). President Obama’s background
is described in his autobiography, BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND
INHERITANCE (2004).
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–07, 453–54 (1857) (holding that blacks could
not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing
diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery as
interfering with property rights of slave owners), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amends. XIII, XIV.
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Court’s racial biases have been relatively transparent. More recently, however,
the Court has invoked three tacit post-racial assumptions to justify the contempo-
rary sacrifice of minority interests in the name of promoting equality for whites.
First, current racial minorities are no longer the victims of significant discrimina-
tion. Second, as a result, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities at the
expense of whites constitute a form of reverse discrimination against whites that
must be prevented in the name of racial equality. Third, because the post-racial
playing field is now level, any disadvantages that racial minorities continue to
suffer must be caused by their own shortcomings rather than by the lingering
effects of now-dissipated past discrimination. I consider actions that are rooted
in these assumptions, and that adversely affect the interests of racial minorities
in order to advance the interests of whites, to constitute a form of contemporary
discrimination that I refer to as “post-racial discrimination.”
Despite its youth, the Roberts Court has been particularly prone to this form
of post-racial discrimination. Perhaps the most damaging post-racial decision
issued by the Roberts Court is its 2009 decision in the Ricci v. DeStefano New
Haven firefighters case.6 There, the Court appears to have commenced a cam-
paign to eviscerate the racially disparate impact cause of action that was created
by the employment discrimination prohibition of Title VII.7 A prior Supreme
Court decision, Washington v. Davis, had held that the equal protection guaran-
tees of the Constitution did not prohibit actions that had an unintended racially
disparate impact.8 But in an arguable usurpation of legislative policymaking
power, the Ricci Court has now smuggled a similar restriction into the realm of
congressionally created, statutory disparate impact claims. Moreover, the Court
has even intimated that it might also hold statutory disparate impact remedies to
be unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection rights of whites.9
The Roberts Court’s assault on disparate impact is disturbing because the
recognition of a disparate impact cause of action seems to offer the most
realistic hope of ever successfully invoking the legal system to help us over-
come our cultural compulsion to discriminate against racial minorities. History
has shown that mere prohibitions on intentional discrimination have not been
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 550–51 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of separate-but-
equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities by finding that segregation did not constitute
unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (upholding World War II exclusion
order that led to Japanese-American internment).
6. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
7. See id. at 2673–74, 2681 (holding that effort to remedy disparate impact constituted intentional
discrimination against whites); cf. id. at 2699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority under-
mines disparate impact cause of action recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431–32
(1971)).
8. 426 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1976) (adopting intent requirement to establish equal protection violation).
9. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676 (expressly leaving open question of whether measures to comply
with Title VII disparate impact provision are constitutional); cf. id. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(suggesting that Title VII disparate impact provision was unconstitutional).
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adequate to achieve racial equality. Also, because the nature of our racial
discrimination problem is systemic rather than episodic in nature, it is unrealis-
tic to think that the problem could ever be resolved through the use of mere
particularized remedies directed at identifiable bad actors. Moreover, we should
now realize that the enduring persistence of racial discrimination in the United
States demonstrates that arguably good intentions are alone insufficient to
neutralize what can only be understood as an underlying cultural commitment to
white privilege.
We do, however, have it within our power to override predictable cultural
compulsions that we cannot control through acts of mere conscious volition. By
adopting a precommitment strategy that focuses on collective conduct rather
than individual intent, we can force ourselves to behave in ways that correspond
to our more noble aspirations. In a culture that was free from even subtle forms
of unconscious discrimination, resources would typically be distributed in ways
that would be free from any appreciable racially disparate impact. Accordingly,
by viewing as suspect any racially disparate allocations of resources that we do
encounter, we could detect and remedy the subtle forms of societal discrimina-
tion that have to date escaped redress under the Supreme Court’s intention-
based equality jurisprudence. However, by expanding to Title VII the hostility
to disparate impact claims that was first adopted in the constitutional law
context by Washington v. Davis, the Roberts Court seems to be moving in
precisely the wrong direction. It is not only making the attainment of genuine
equality more difficult, but in so doing, it is illustrating why the problem of
racial discrimination is systemic rather than individualized in nature.
Part I of this Essay discusses the claim that we have now become a post-
racial society, arguing that this claim itself constitutes a form of systemic
discrimination against racial minorities. Section I.A describes the history of
Supreme Court involvement in the sacrifice of minority interests for the benefit
of the white majority in order to establish a context in which the racial
jurisprudence of the contemporary Supreme Court can be assessed. Section I.B
describes how the contemporary Court has used post-racial assumptions to
perpetuate discrimination against racial minorities in the name of protecting the
equality interests of whites.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s hostility to disparate impact claims.
Section II.A describes how the Court rejected disparate impact claims under its
constitutional equality jurisprudence. Section II.B describes how the Roberts
Court is extending this hostility to the statutory disparate impact claims created
by Congress in Title VII.
Part III argues that the recognition of disparate impact claims is a sensible
precommitment strategy for the resolution of the nation’s persistent racial
discrimination problem. Section III.A argues that racial discrimination is so
deeply embedded in United States culture that it cannot be eradicated through
mere voluntary efforts to behave in nondiscriminatory ways. Section III.B
argues that viewing racially disparate impact as sufficiently suspect to warrant a
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presumptive remedy would enable the culture to approximate the genuine racial
equality that its ingrained racial attitudes have thus far precluded it from
attaining. The Conclusion expresses the fear that Supreme Court jurisprudence
will continue to reject disparate impact claims in the name of post-racialism
precisely because the Court is one of the institutions on which the culture relies
to perpetuate its systemic discrimination against racial minorities.
I. POST-RACIALISM
The term “racialism” has been used by critical scholars to describe the view
that racial discrimination in United States culture constitutes a mere aberrational
deviation from the norm of colorblind race neutrality that properly should
govern the formulation and implementation of our social policies. Critical
scholars consider racialism to be artificially reductionist because it fails to
appreciate the degree to which racial considerations are themselves embedded
in the very institutions on which we rely to make social policy. As a result, the
cultural influence of race is not only systemic and inevitable, but it creates a
problem that can never be adequately addressed by treating racial discrimina-
tion as a mere particularized product of individual bad actors. Any meaningful
remedy will have to be as systemic in scope as the nature of racial discrimina-
tion itself.10
If that view is correct, the suggestion that United States culture has now
evolved to a post-racial status actually exacerbates the problem of racial discrimi-
nation by pretending not only that the phenomenon of race is particularized
rather than systemic but that even particularized instances of discrimination
have now largely disappeared. In fact, the Supreme Court is itself one of the
social institutions that has historically been responsible for promoting systemic
discrimination against racial minorities. Moreover, the contemporary Court has
continued that practice by incorporating post-racial assumptions into its equality
jurisprudence. Those post-racial assumptions do not simply misidentify the
nature of our discrimination problem; they deny that a problem even exists.
A. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
United States culture has always discriminated against racial minorities. In a
variety of ways it has sacrificed the interests of racial minorities in order to
advance the interests of the white majority, and the Supreme Court has often
been an active participant in those discriminatory endeavors.11 The 1823 Su-
preme Court decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh upheld the seizure of Indian lands
10. See KIMBERLE´ CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT, at xxiv–xxvii (1995).
11. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT 161 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court has
historically performed “veiled majoritarian” function of sacrificing racial minority interests for benefit
of white majority).
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by the United States.12 The 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford held that
blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitu-
tion and that Congress could not interfere with the property rights of white slave
owners by trying to limit the spread of slavery in new United States territories.13
The 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the official segregation of publicly
regulated facilities.14 Moreover, Supreme Court decisions issued during post-
Civil War Reconstruction permitted Southern states to implement an explicit
regime of white supremacy either by refusing to invalidate laws and practices
that exploited blacks or by failing to enforce the nominally protective rulings
that the Court did issue. Under this regime, slavery was essentially reinstituted
through the practice of peonage, black voters were disenfranchised, housing
segregation was preserved, and blacks were openly discriminated against in the
criminal justice system.15
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Court infamously upheld the
World War II exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese-American
citizens in Korematsu v. United States.16 Although the Court formally desegre-
gated public schools in the 1954 Brown (I) decision,17 the 1955 decision in
Brown (II)18 actually allowed Southern schools to remain segregated for the
next decade.19 In the 1955–56 case of Naim v. Naim, the Court also declined to
invalidate Virginia’s miscegenation statute, even though Brown seemed to
render such invidious racial classifications unconstitutional.20 In the 1970s, the
12. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587–88 (1823) (holding that European discovery and conquest divested
original Indian inhabitants of title to land that now constitutes the United States).
13. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–07, 452 (1857).
14. 163 U.S. 537, 548, 550–51 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of separate-but-equal regime of
racial discrimination in public facilities by finding that segregation did not constitute unconstitutional
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
15. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 61–97, 117–35, 135–70 (2004) (discussing formal minority victories in Supreme
Court that made little practical difference in preventing actual discrimination). See generally DOUGLAS
A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008); CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
16. 323 U.S. 214, 215–19 (1944).
17. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting separate-but-equal
doctrine and declaring official school segregation to be unconstitutional).
18. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (tempering effect of Brown I by
declining to order immediate school desegregation and instead requiring desegregation “with all
deliberate speed”).
19. See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 473–79 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing delay in
implementation of Brown I).
20. 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam). In Naim, the United States Supreme Court was asked to
hold unconstitutional a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been upheld by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. See id. The United States Supreme Court vacated the Virginia decision and remanded
for clarification of the record. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed
its earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1956) (per
curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to recall or amend the mandate,
finding that the constitutional question had not been “properly presented.” Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985,
985 (1956) (per curiam). This allowed the Virginia Court’s decision to remain in effect. Id. Because the
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Court then refused to desegregate northern and western schools that were de
facto rather than de jure segregated, and those schools remain largely segre-
gated today.21 Brown has since been used to invalidate affirmative action
programs on the ground that they violate the principle of colorblind race
neutrality.22
One might suggest that I am focusing on only Supreme Court decisions that
adversely affected the interests of racial minorities while ignoring the decisions
in which racial minority interests prevailed. However, my point is not that the
Supreme Court never ruled in favor of racial minorities. Rather, it is that the
Court has historically served as an institution that did more to keep minorities in
a subordinate position than it did to promote racial equality. In fact, such an
institution can enhance its perceived legitimacy by permitting occasional victo-
ries for those whom it subordinates.23
In addition, many of the Supreme Court decisions that did purport to protect
minority interests ultimately had very limited beneficial effects. As has already
been noted, Brown turned out to be more useful in outlawing affirmative action
than it was in desegregating public schools.24 Although Shelly v. Kraemer
refused to enforce racially restrictive covenants in residential real estate transac-
tions, it specifically held that such covenants were legally valid if complied with
neutrality principle that had been announced in Brown I seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation
statute unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court’s failure to resolve Naim on the merits also
seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction over the case, the
Supreme Court’s actions in Naim have been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (“[T]here are a very few dismissals similarly indefensible in law.”);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959)
(noting that dismissal of the miscegenation case was “wholly without basis in the law”). The Supreme
Court ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute as a manifestation of white supremacy
eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11–12 (1967), when only sixteen states still had
miscegenation statutes on the books.
21. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208–09, 212 (1973) (adopting expansive interpreta-
tion of de jure segregation but reaffirming prohibition on use of race-conscious remedies to eliminate de
facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971) (same);
see also STONE ET AL., supra note 19, at 479–88 (discussing current de facto school segregation); cf.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1976) (reading Equal Protection Clause to permit racially
disparate impact not directly caused by intentional discrimination); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
733–35, 744–45 (1974) (refusing to allow inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segrega-
tion, thereby permitting suburban schools to remain predominantly white and inner-city schools to
remain overwhelmingly minority).
22. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293–95, 307 (1978) (controlling
opinion of Powell, J.) (reading Brown I to prohibit affirmative action that benefits racial minorities at
the expense of whites).
23. See SPANN, supra note 11, at 19–26, 94–99, 104–60 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court has
historically performed “veiled majoritarian” function of sacrificing racial minority interests for benefit
of white majority).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 17–22 (discussing Brown, school segregation, and affirma-
tive action).
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voluntarily.25 And, of course, Shelley did little to eliminate the pervasive
housing discrimination that continues to exist even today.26 The Supreme Court
nominally prohibited racial discrimination in jury selection in Strauder v. West
Virginia,27 and more recently in Batson v. Kentucky,28 but as the Court indicated
in Hernandez v. New York, discriminatory jury selection can still be accom-
plished by using the fig leaf of indirect proxies for race.29 In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, the Supreme Court held that racial gerrymandering could not be used
to disenfranchise black voters,30 but the Court’s subsequent decision in Shaw v.
Reno held that this same principle prohibited racial gerrymandering to equalize
the voting strength of historically disenfranchised minority voters.31 Even the
Court’s early decisions upholding racial affirmative action have now been
largely overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.32 Throughout its
history, the Supreme Court has been more of an opponent than an ally in the
minority quest for racial equality.
The Supreme Court’s history of ruling against racial minority interests in
order to advance the interests of the white majority continues to have lingering
effects. Even if one assumes that active discrimination against racial minorities
has now ceased to exist—a dubious assumption—our present racially-correlated
distribution of societal benefits and burdens indicates that passive discrimina-
tion against racial minorities continues to flourish. By acquiescing in the
momentum of past discrimination, the Supreme Court helps to perpetuate the
25. 334 U.S. 1, 13, 19–20 (1948) (prohibiting judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants but not
holding such covenants unlawful).
26. See generally JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM
passim (2005) (documenting history of intentional residential segregation in United States); DOUGLAS
MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
passim (1993) (discussing concept of urban residential “hypersegregation” in United States).
27. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (prohibiting discrimination in selection of jury venire).
28. 476 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1986) (prohibiting discrimination in selection of petit jury).
29. 500 U.S. 352, 369–70 (1992) (permitting Latino jurors to be struck because they spoke Spanish
and might not, therefore, rely on official English translation of Spanish testimony).
30. 364 U.S. 339, 341–42 (1960) (holding that racial gerrymander to disenfranchise black voters
would be unconstitutional).
31. 509 U.S. 630, 649–51, 653–58 (1993) (granting white voters cause of action to challenge
creation of majority-minority voting districts).
32. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995) (overruling Metro
Broadcasting by rejecting application of intermediate scrutiny to some minority-favoring racial classifi-
cations and applying strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action program designed to benefit minority
contractors), overruling Metro Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600–01 (1990). See generally
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECI-
SIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159–63 (2000) (discussing Supreme Court affirmative action decisions and
voting blocs). The Court’s current treatment of affirmative action is arguably inconsistent. Compare
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–30, 334 (2003) (upholding University of Michigan law school
affirmative action program for student admissions), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255–57,
275–76 (2003) (invalidating arguably indistinguishable University of Michigan undergraduate affirma-
tive action program on same day that Grutter was decided).
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racial imbalance that has historically existed in the distribution of resources.33
However, the momentum of past discrimination is now being supplemented by
present discrimination rooted in the Court’s adherence to post-racial assump-
tions. And it is in the context of the Court’s past antipathy to racial minority
interests that the Court’s present attraction to post-racialism should be evalu-
ated.
B. POST-RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Since Justice Powell retired from the Supreme Court in 1987, the Court has
engaged in bloc voting on the issue of race. When the interests of whites and
racial minorities have been in conflict, Justices in the conservative bloc have
virtually always voted in favor of white interests, while Justices in the liberal
bloc have virtually always voted in favor of minority interests. Since Justice
Kennedy replaced Justice Powell in 1988, the conservative bloc has constituted
a voting majority on the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court has typically
ruled against racial minority interests in affirmative action, redistricting, and
school desegregation cases.34
The theory that the Court has commonly used to rule against racial minorities
is rooted in three post-racial assumptions. First, the Court has assumed that
there is insufficient continuing discrimination against racial minorities to war-
rant race-conscious remedies. Second, the Court has assumed that the use of
race-conscious remedies would constitute unlawful reverse discrimination against
whites. Third, the Court has assumed that, because whites and racial minorities
now compete on a level playing field, any continuing disadvantages suffered by
racial minorities is the result of the choices and abilities of racial minorities
themselves.35
The Supreme Court’s post-racial belief that minorities no longer need special
legal protections—protections that, in the Court’s view, make minorities the
perpetrators rather than the victims of racial discrimination—is a view that has
now solidified on the Roberts Court. In the 2007 case of Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the conservative bloc chose
33. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 299–304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing, in case that
invalidated affirmative action program, striking racial disparities that continue to exist in distribution of
societal resources).
34. See SPANN, supra note 32, at 159–63 (discussing Supreme Court voting record in affirmative
action and redistricting cases); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
565, 566–75 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District Number 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion), which invalidated voluntary
race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation of public schools).
35. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 498–508 (1989) (utilizing
assumptions to invalidate minority construction set-aside); see also Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at
226–31 (applying strict scrutiny to construction set-aside that presumed racial minorities to be
economically and socially more disadvantaged than whites); Shaw v Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–52,
653–58 (1993) (creating cause of action for white voters to challenge majority-minority voting districts
as reverse discrimination against whites that is not necessary to remedy past voting discrimination
against minorities).
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to protect the school-choice preferences of white parents.36 It did so by invalidat-
ing voluntary race-conscious integration plans that had been adopted by the
Seattle and Louisville school boards in an effort to prevent the post-Brown
resegregation of public schools that was occurring as a result of residential
population shifts.37 Chief Justice Roberts actually read the Brown prohibition on
race-conscious segregation of public schools as establishing a principle that
barred the race-conscious integration of public schools.38
Even more strikingly, in the 2009 case of Ricci v. DeStefano, the conservative
bloc invalidated a refusal by the city of New Haven to utilize the results of a
firefighter promotion exam that had a racially disparate impact.39 Even though
the city argued that it was trying to avoid a violation of Title VII’s prohibition
on employment practices that have an unjustifiable racially disparate impact, the
Court held that the city’s race-conscious efforts to avoid a disparate impact
violation themselves constituted a violation of Title VII’s prohibition on inten-
tional discrimination against white firefighters.40 The Court even suggested that
it might in the future be compelled to hold the Title VII disparate impact
provision unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection rights of
whites.41
United States culture’s concern with reverse discrimination against whites has
been around for some time.42 But the election of Barack Obama as the first
black President of the United States has now given that concern renewed
vitality. The post-racial assumptions on which the Supreme Court’s recent race
decisions rest simply seem more plausible now that a black person has been
elected President. However, those assumptions can also serve as the basis for
continued discrimination against racial minorities. The Court’s historical deci-
sions illustrate that the Supreme Court has always been a more reliable guardian
of white interests than it has been of minority interests.43 And the Court’s more
recent conservative bloc decisions illustrate that this Supreme Court partisan-
ship has persisted. What has changed, however, is the justification that the Court
is now able to offer for its continued protection of white interests. It can now
make the post-racial claim that there is simply no significant discrimination left
to be remedied. Stated differently, the Court can now use this claim to engage in
a new type of discrimination—post-racial discrimination. And perhaps the most
36. 551 U.S. 701, 711, 722 (2007) (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 709–11.
38. See id. at 746–48.
39. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
40. See id. at 2664.
41. See id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that Title VII disparate impact provision was
unconstitutional); cf. id. at 2676 (majority opinion) (declining to address constitutionality of Title VII
disparate impact provision).
42. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 35.
43. See SPANN, supra note 11, at 19–26, 94–99, 104–60 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court has
historically performed “veiled majoritarian” function of sacrificing racial minority interests for benefit
of white majority).
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significant feature of such post-racial discrimination is its insistence on disregard-
ing the racially disparate impact produced by the ways in which we customarily
allocate societal resources.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT
Post-racial discrimination disadvantages racial minorities by refusing to recog-
nize disparate impact as a cognizable form of racial inequality. For more than
thirty years, the Supreme Court has declined to view racially disparate impact as
a form of discrimination that violates the equal protection principle of the
United States Constitution. Now, however, the Roberts Court has begun to
extend that constitutional holding to statutory disparate impact claims created
by Congress under Title VII. In fact, it is the evisceration of statutory disparate-
impact claims that seems to constitute the essence of the Roberts Court’s
decision in Ricci. Although the Supreme Court arguably has the authority to
decide what the concept of equality entails under the Constitution, the Court’s
decision to supplant statutory disparate impact claims under Title VII seems to
entail a usurpation of legislative policymaking authority that is inconsistent with
the constitutional separation of powers.
A. THE CONSTITUTION
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis that the equal
protection principle of the Constitution prohibited intentional discrimination
based on race, but it did not prohibit unintentional actions that had a mere
racially disparate impact.44 The Court further elaborated on the meaning of its
intentional discrimination standard in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, where
the Court emphasized that the equal protection principle could be satisfied only
by actual motivating intent—the intent to take an action “because of . . .
its adverse effect” on a racial minority, or some other prohibited purpose.45 The
intent to take an action merely “in spite of” its known disparate impact was not
sufficient to establish an equal protection violation.46
The Court’s Washington v. Davis decision was a bit surprising for three
reasons. First, some of the Supreme Court’s own prior decisions had suggested
that a disparate impact principle—an effects principle, rather than an intent
principle—should govern equal protection claims.47 Moreover, a number of
lower court decisions had ruled that disparate impact was alone sufficient to
establish an equal protection violation.48 Nevertheless, the only policy justifica-
44. 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976).
45. 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979).
46. Id.
47. See Washington, 442 U.S. at 242–44 (citing prior Supreme Court decisions); see also SPANN,
supra note 11, at 38–39 (discussing Washington v. Davis).
48. See Washington, 442 U.S. at 244–45, 245 n.12 (citing 13 courts of appeals decisions and four
district court decisions).
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tion the Court offered for its adoption of a constitutional intent principle rather
than an effects principle was that the adoption of a disparate impact principle
might apply to a “whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes” that have a racially disparate impact.49 This justification
suggests not that the Court viewed disparate impact as non discriminatory, but
rather viewed disparate impact as so pervasively discriminatory that it would be
awkward to remedy.
A second reason for viewing the Washington v. Davis Court’s adoption of an
intent standard as surprising is that the Court must have been well aware of its
own complicity in post-Reconstruction discrimination against former black
slaves, which was pervasively practiced by southern white supremacists and
northern Democrats. Although the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to
vote without regard to race, southern white supremacists engaged in various
forms of murder, fraud, and voter intimidation in order to prevent blacks from
voting. Despite the success of these tactics in disenfranchising most southern
black voters, the Supreme Court did not meaningfully intervene to protect the
franchise that was granted by the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.50 Similarly, the
Court tolerated most southern white supremacist efforts to evade federal legisla-
tion that prohibited discrimination against blacks in jury service, and blacks
were largely excluded from southern juries until after World War II.51 The Court
also tolerated the successful southern white supremacist effort to reinstitute
post-Reconstruction slavery through peonage, the discriminatory enforcement
of vagrancy laws, and harsh convict labor practices.52 The reason that Supreme
Court interventions had little practical effect during this period is that the Court
chose to accept at face value the obviously disingenuous claim that race-neutral
intent had motivated the discriminatory actions of the southern states that took
those actions. The Supreme Court simply ignored the stark racial disparities that
those discriminatory actions produced, even though such disparate impact made
the state claims of neutral intent wholly implausible.53 In light of the Court’s
prior failings to protect racial minority rights during the post-Reconstruction
era, it is not immediately apparent why the Washington v. Davis Court would
have chosen to go down that path again in 1976.
A third reason why the Washington v. Davis intent holding is surprising lies in
a comment that Justice White made near the end of his majority opinion. He
stated that the potentially “far-reaching” consequences of a disparate impact
49. Id. at 248 (discussing breadth of disparate impact principle); see also SPANN, supra note 11, at 38
(discussing Washington v. Davis intent requirement).
50. See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 28–39 (discussing disenfranchisement).
51. See id. at 39–43, 55–57 (discussing jury service); cf. LANE, supra note 15, passim (discussing
violent Louisiana massacre used to prevent black and white Republican office holders from assuming
office).
52. See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 71–76, 86–88 (discussing peonage system based on vagrancy
laws and convict labor); see generally BLACKMON, supra note 15, passim (same).
53. See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 8–10; id. at 33–39 (voting); id. at 39, 41–43 (juries); cf. id. at 72,
86–88, 96–97 (invalidating some peonage laws, but not ending practice of peonage).
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standard made its desirability a question of legislative rather than judicial
competence.54 That makes the Washington v. Davis holding surprising because
Congress had spoken. At the time Washington v. Davis was decided, the
Supreme Court had already read the employment discrimination prohibition of
Title VII to contain a disparate impact standard, rather than merely an inten-
tional discrimination standard. If the Court’s reading of Title VII was genuinely
rooted in congressional intent, the Court should have viewed Congress as
having established both the practicability and the policy desirability of a
disparate impact standard. Even if the Court’s reading of Title VII was a
creative reading, rooted in the Court’s own understanding of the need to
recognize disparate impact claims, the Court should have read the constitutional
equal protection principle in the same way that it had read the antidiscrimina-
tion principle under Title VII.
B. TITLE VII
In the 1971 case Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court held that the
prohibition on employment discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 barred both intentional discrimination and employment
practices that had an unintended racially disparate impact.55 In the absence of an
adequate showing of job-related business necessity, disparate impact was alone
sufficient to establish a Title VII violation. The Court stated that its disparate-
impact holding was “plain from the language of the statute,”56 which prohibited
subjecting an individual to adverse employment actions “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”57 The Court reasoned
that a prohibition on disparate impact was necessary to prevent prospective
discrimination through the use of neutral practices that would “operate to
‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”58 Accord-
ingly, the Griggs Court viewed Congress as having adopted a disparate impact
policy that was necessary to any meaningful conception of prospective equality.
The nature of the political coalition supporting adoption of Title VII in 1964
makes it unclear whether the Griggs disparate impact holding can fairly be
attributed to any actual intent of Congress, and the Griggs decision has been
criticized on this ground.59 Regardless of its original intent, however, Congress
has now expressly endorsed the Griggs disparate impact understanding. Not
only did Congress acquiesce in Griggs by letting the decision stand for twenty
years without statutory modification, but in 1991 Congress actually codified
54. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 248.
55. 401 U.S. 424, 429–32 (1971); see also SPANN, supra note 11, at 38–40 (discussing Washington v.
Davis and Griggs).
56. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
58. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30.
59. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493, 506–07, 516–17 (2003) (discussing criticism of Griggs and actual intent of Congress).
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Griggs in the Title VII amendments that it adopted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991—a statute that was enacted to overrule certain post-Griggs Su-
preme Court discrimination decisions that Congress viewed as insufficiently
protective of racial minorities.60 Despite Griggs and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the Roberts Court has now chosen to launch an attack on Title VII
disparate impact claims—an attack that is difficult to understand in a non-
invidious way.
The Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in the New Haven firefighters case of
Ricci v. DeStefano appears to constitute a conservative bloc assault on the
concept of disparate impact discrimination.61 The Ricci Court’s invalidation of
New Haven’s decision to reject the racially disparate results of its firefighter
promotion exam rested on the Court’s conclusion that the City’s effort to avoid
a disparate impact violation of Title VII under Griggs would itself constitute an
intentional discrimination, “disparate-treatment” violation of Title VII against
the 17 white firefighters, and one Latino firefighter, who had scored well on the
exam.62 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in the 5–4 decision found that a
tension existed between the intentional discrimination and disparate impact
provisions of Title VII.63 The opinion went on to hold that the conscious
consideration of race undertaken to avoid a disparate impact burden on racial
minorities would entail prohibited intentional discrimination against whites,
unless there was a “strong basis in evidence” to believe that a disparate impact
violation would otherwise occur.64 Justice Kennedy borrowed the “strong basis
in evidence” standard from the Court’s conservative bloc constitutional deci-
sions, which had invalidated voluntary racial affirmative action programs unless
a strong basis in evidence existed for believing that affirmative action was
necessary to prevent unconstitutional discrimination against racial minorities.65
Those constitutional affirmative action decisions were, of course, governed by
the Washington v. Davis standard that had rejected disparate impact claims in
favor of intentional discrimination.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ricci emphasized that the Supreme Court had
never before found even “a hint” of conflict to exist between the Title VII
intentional discrimination and disparate impact provisions.66 Rather, the two
provisions were actually complementary prohibitions designed to address the
same objective of ending workplace discrimination.67 Justice Ginsburg also
60. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (making reference to
Griggs and other Supreme Court decisions recognizing disparate impact claims); see also SPANN, supra
note 11, at 1, 173–74 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1991); Primus, supra note 59, at 516–18
(discussing Griggs and Civil Rights Act of 1991).
61. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
62. Id. at 2671.
63. Id. at 2604.
64. Id. at 2675.
65. See id. at 2675–76.
66. Id. at 2699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2700.
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argued that the “strong basis in evidence” standard borrowed from equal
protection cases was simply inapposite precisely because the Washington v.
Davis standard governing constitutional cases did not recognize the statutory
disparate impact claims that were prohibited by Title VII under Griggs and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.68 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent went on to argue that the
New Haven decision to disregard its racially disparate exam results should
survive even under the majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard. That was
because it would be difficult to find a defense for the disparate impact produced
by the New Haven promotion exam if the results were to be certified. Business
necessity can serve as such a defense. But, that defense was not available in this
case because there existed ample alternative promotion procedures that could
serve any legitimate business-necessity concerns without creating a racially
disparate impact. Indeed, those alternatives were being used by two-thirds of the
other fire departments in the nation.69
The Supreme Court did not expressly invalidate Title VII disparate impact
claims in Ricci. Indeed, it purported to recognize the continued existence of
such claims.70 However, it undermined the ability of racial minorities to main-
tain Title VII disparate impact causes of action by holding that disparate impact
claims would always be outweighed by the competing intentional discrimina-
tion claims of whites, unless minorities could show a “strong basis in evidence”
for their disparate impact claims. It seems quite clear that the “strong basis in
evidence” standard can be satisfied only in exceptional cases, if it can ever be
satisfied at all. The conservative bloc has never found the standard to be
satisfied in any of the constitutional affirmative action cases that it cited as
giving rise to the standard.71 In addition, the standard was held not to have been
satisfied under the facts of Ricci itself, even though the presence of less
discriminatory, job-related alternatives would seem to indicate that the standard
should have been easily satisfied under the facts of the case.72
Justice Kennedy’s opinion also illustrated the extreme stringency of the
“strong basis in evidence” standard by rejecting the city’s “strong basis in
evidence claim” on a motion for summary judgment. Under any reading of the
evidence, there was at least a genuine factual dispute about the existence of less
discriminatory, job-related alternatives. But the Ricci majority refused even to
remand the case for trial.73
68. See id. at 2701.
69. Id. at 2705.
70. See id. at 2673 (majority opinion) (recognizing prima facie disparate impact claim).
71. See id. at 2675 (citing constitutional cases that invalidated affirmative action plans under strong
basis in evidence standard); id. at 2700–02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (upholding educational affirmative action plan as serving compelling state
interest in promoting prospective diversity rather than as remedy for past discrimination).
72. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2706–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that standard was satisfied).
73. Id. at 2677 (majority opinion) (resolving case in favor of white firefighters on summary
judgment); cf. id. at 2706–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that factual disputes precluded
summary judgment).
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In what appears to be an in terrorem maneuver, the Ricci majority expressly
declined to address the constitutionality of Title VII disparate impact claims, in
a context suggesting that the Title VII disparate impact cause of action might
itself subsequently be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.74 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion even suggested that he was
presently prepared to hold the Title VII disparate impact provision unconstitu-
tional.75 Threatening unconstitutionality in dicta, as part of an effort to advance
the Court’s regulatory agenda through chill rather than actual adjudication,
appears to be a recurring technique employed by the Roberts Court.76
The Supreme Court now appears to be forcing Title VII into the doctrinal
regime that it has used to neutralize affirmative action. Since the conservative
bloc majority took control of the Supreme Court, the Court has invalidated
every constitutional affirmative action program that it has considered on the
merits, with only one exception.77 In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court upheld an
affirmative action program adopted to increase racial diversity at the University
of Michigan Law School.78 On the same day, however, the Court also invali-
dated a similar affirmative action program adopted to increase racial diversity in
the University of Michigan undergraduate college in Gratz v. Bollinger.79 In
Grutter, Justice O’Connor provided the fifth vote to uphold that law school
program,80 but Justice O’Connor has now been replaced on the Supreme Court
by Justice Alito.81 Justice Alito’s vote to invalidate the voluntary school integra-
tion plans that the Roberts Court held unconstitutional in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 182 suggests that Justice
Alito is unlikely to vote in favor of affirmative action programs for racial
minorities.83 Accordingly, it now seems likely that the fate of disparate impact
claims under Title VII will replicate the fate of affirmative action under the
Court’s conservative bloc jurisprudence. Even if one thinks that such Supreme
Court racial policymaking is arguably legitimate for the interpretation of consti-
tutional claims under the Equal Protection Clause, it is not legitimate for
74. See id. at 2676 (majority opinion)
75. See id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511–13 (2009) (threatening
to declare section 5 of Voting Rights Act unconstitutional if Congress does not modify the statute); id.
at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court quite
properly alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer boundaries of its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
authority and may not be constitutional.”).
77. See Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 437–38 (2009)
(discussing conservative Supreme Court voting bloc on issue of race).
78. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
79. 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
80. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (listing votes of Justices).
81. STONE ET AL., supra note 19, at lxxxviii–xc (table showing replacement of Justice O’Connor by
Justice Alito).
82. 551 U.S. 701, 708 (2007) (listing votes of Justices).
83. See Spann, supra note 77, at 437–38 (discussing conservative Supreme Court voting bloc on
issue of race).
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statutory claims under Title VII.
The Supreme Court opinion in Washington v. Davis stated that Congress
should determine by statute whether the recognition of disparate impact claims
is appropriate.84 That observation is consistent with separation of powers
principles because the politically accountable Congress is institutionally more
competent than the politically insulated Supreme Court to formulate racial
policy for the nation. There is often a perceived zero-sum relationship between
the allocation of limited societal resources to whites and the allocation of those
resources to racial minorities. Whites want to retain the resources to which they
feel entitled by prior cultural practice, while racial minorities want to escape the
disadvantages to which they have been consigned through past discrimination.
Recognizing this, Congress included a disparate impact provision in its Title VII
prohibition on discriminatory employment practices, which it thought would
balance the competing employment interests of whites and racial minorities.
Racially disparate impact would be tolerated only if it was compelled by
job-related business necessity, and only if there was no less discriminatory
alternative that could adequately serve an employer’s legitimate business needs.85
The Title VII disparate impact provision embodies a textbook example of a
legislative policy judgment—a judgment made by a politically accountable
Congress, whom the doctrine of separation of powers charges with the task of
balancing competing constituent interests. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
chose to upset the legislative balance that Congress struck in Title VII. The
Ricci Court undermined the effectiveness of statutory disparate impact claims,
and it suggested that the recognition of such claims might even be unconstitu-
tional. Moreover, it did this despite the fact that Congress, in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, was seeking to overturn precisely the sorts of restrictive Title VII
decisions that the Supreme Court had issued in the past—and that it has now
issued again in Ricci.86 In its effort to eviscerate Title VII disparate impact
claims, therefore, the Roberts Supreme Court has exceeded the legitimate scope
of its judicial power. It has usurped legislative policymaking power by overrid-
ing majoritarian political remedies directed at entrenched modes of racial
discrimination. That usurpation is particularly unfortunate because the disparate
impact remedies that the Court has chosen to neutralize offer the most realistic
hope of ever achieving a meaningful level of racial equality in the United
States.87
84. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
85. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–73 (2009) (describing Title VII disparate impact
test).
86. See id. at 2696–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
intended to overrule Supreme Court’s restrictive Title VII decisions).
87. Although I fear that Ricci has sounded an effective death knell for Title VII disparate impact
claims, at least one federal district court has upheld a disparate impact claim in the aftermath of Ricci.
In United States v. Vulcan Society, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), the court invalidated New
York City’s reliance on firefighter selection exams that were used to choose candidates for admission to
the New York City Fire Academy, holding that those exams had an impermissible racially disparate
2010] 1149DISPARATE IMPACT
III. PRECOMMITMENT
Post-racial claims notwithstanding, it should now be apparent that racial
discrimination is a persistent feature of United States culture. The fact that
racial minorities remain underrepresented in the allocation of societal benefits
and overrepresented in the allocation of societal burdens illustrates that the
inclination to favor the interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities
is so deeply embedded in the culture that it cannot be eradicated through mere
voluntary efforts to avoid discrimination. Even a sincere commitment to the
principle of racial equality will be insufficient to end those forms of subtle and
unconscious “societal discrimination” that have become a constitutive feature of
the culture.88 Accordingly, the most realistic hope that United States culture has
for ever achieving genuine racial equality lies in its willingness to adopt a
precommitment strategy that will force its behavior to approximate the behavior
of a culture that has somehow managed to transcend its discriminatory racial
attitudes.
Precommitment strategies are commonly used to increase one’s fidelity to a
desired course of action by eliminating options that are inconsistent with that
course of action. Burning your bridges behind you before going into battle is a
classic precommitment strategy that is designed to preclude the option of
retreat. Similarly, adopting a constitution that supersedes ordinary law is a
classic precommitment strategy that is designed to preclude the option of
unprincipled political actions that might seem compelling in the heat of the
moment.89
Recognition of disparate impact as a cognizable form of racial discrimination
also constitutes a sensible precommitment strategy. Although our racial biases
and predispositions may not permit us to allocate societal resources in a racially
nondiscriminatory manner, we can nevertheless force ourselves to approximate
the resource allocations that would exist in a culture that was capable of
authentic racial equality. But such a precommitment to racial equality is pre-
cisely what the Supreme Court now seems intent on preventing.
A. EMBEDDED INEQUALITY
Speaking of United States dependence on foreign energy sources in his 2006
State of the Union address, former President George W. Bush stated that
“America is addicted to oil.”90 Even though we know that our voracious
impact that constituted an employment discrimination violation of Title VII. The Vulcan court distin-
guished Ricci by finding that Ricci addressed a potential disparate impact violation of Title VII, whereas
Vulcan addressed an actual violation of Title VII. Id. at 83.
88. See infra text accompanying note 107 (discussing “societal discrimination”).
89. See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present To
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1193–1200 (2009) (discussing theoretical foundations
for precommitment strategies).
90. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Adam Nagourney, Bush, Resetting Agenda, Says U.S. Must Cut
Reliance on Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1 (quoting President Bush).
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appetite for energy leaves us vulnerable to harms ranging from economic
hardship, to domestic environmental threats, to foreign political instability, we
still seem unable to curb our oil consumption in any meaningful way. Even
though we know better, we cannot seem to control our behavior. That is what it
means to be addicted.
Likewise, the United States is addicted to racial discrimination. Even though
we know that treating racial minorities as inferior to whites is inconsistent with
the moral, ethical, and legal theories of equality to which we have long
subscribed, the benefits to the white majority of continued discrimination
against racial minorities are apparently too compelling for the culture to resist.
From the seizure of Indian lands, to slavery, to official segregation, to wartime
hysteria, to de facto segregation, to the invalidation of affirmative action,91 and
most recently to the resegregation of public schools,92 white majoritarian
United States culture has been committed to the subordination of racial minority
interests in pervasive and persistent ways. That is a form of white supremacy.
And our addiction to it is an addiction from which we appear no more able to
wean ourselves than we have been able to wean ourselves from our addiction to
foreign oil.
The belief that white interests are more important than racial minority
interests is simply a constitutive element of United States culture. One of the
things that it means to be an American is to have internalized, at some very
fundamental level, the realization that it is permissible to sacrifice minority
interests for the benefit of whites. And that realization is often both deep and
unconscious in nature.93 That is why we tolerate the dramatic discrepancies in
the allocation of societal resources that continue to exist between whites and
racial minorities. Justice Ginsburg has emphasized that conscious and uncon-
scious biases have caused large racial disparities to continue to exist in unemploy-
ment, poverty, access to health care, and access to education.94 Moreover,
minorities continue to suffer discrimination in employment, real estate markets,
and consumer transactions.95 Minorities are also statistically discriminated against
in matters as diverse as retail car negotiations, kidney transplants, and bail
setting.96 Recent social cognition research using the Implicit Association Test to
measure unconscious racial prejudice has demonstrated that most of us remain
91. See supra text accompanying notes 11–22 (describing illustrative cases).
92. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746–48 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (citing Brown II as authorizing resegregation of public schools).
93. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–23 (1987) (arguing that much contemporary racial discrimina-
tion is unconscious).
94. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 299–302 (discussing striking racial disparities that continue to exist in distribution of
societal resources).
96. See Ian Ayres, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINA-
TION 19–44, 165–232, 233–311 (2001) (documenting statistical discrimination).
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influenced by vast amounts of unconscious prejudice.97 And other recent re-
search has indicated that our culture transmits subtle racial stratification mes-
sages so successfully that even young children quickly learn to internalize the
culture’s commitment to minority inferiority, despite the efforts of their parents
to instill in them values of colorblind race neutrality.98
Subtle forms of voting discrimination against racial minorities remain serious
enough that Congress recently, and overwhelmingly, reauthorized the Voting
Rights Act of 1965—even though the Roberts Court has now threatened to hold
the Act unconstitutional.99 And, of course, residential housing segregation
continues to exist in the United States at such an alarming rate that it has been
referred to as “American Apartheid.”100 The advantages and sense of natural
entitlement entailed in being white in the United States remain so strong that
Cheryl Harris has characterized whiteness as a property right.101 Commentators
have even suggested that the surprising vitriol that has accompanied conserva-
tive assaults on President Obama’s undeniably moderate health care and other
economic programs—as well as the personal attacks on President Obama
himself—are motivated at least in part by lingering racial animosity emanating
from the intolerable idea of having a black person serve as President of the
United States.102 Even racial minorities themselves have at times kept a low
profile in the health care debate for fear that popular recognition of the degree to
which health care reform would benefit minorities might increase the chance
97. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1509–14 (2005) (discussing
unconscious racial bias revealed by Implicit Association Test).
98. See Po Bronson & Amy Merryman, See Baby Discriminate: Kids as Young as 6 Months Judge
Others Based on Skin Color. What’s a Parent To Do?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 2009, at 53 (describing
racial attitudes in young children).
99. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508–11, 2513–17 (2009)
(discussing facts and holding); id. at 2511–13 (suggesting that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 would now be unconstitutional). Justice Thomas expressed similar sentiments, stating that “[t]he
Court quite properly alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer boundaries of its Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority and may not be constitutional.” See id. at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
100. See generally LOEWEN, supra note 26, passim (documenting history of intentional residential
segregation in United States); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 26, passim (discussing concept of urban
residential “hypersegregation” in United States).
101. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714–15 (1993)
(discussing sense of white entitlement).
102. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor, Seeking Healing, Seeing Hostility: Some at Black Family Reunion
Criticize Protests Against Obama, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2009, at B1 (discussing racially motivated
opposition to Obama); Maureen Dowd, Boy, Oh, Boy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at WK.17 (same);
Colbert I. King, A Dangerous Kind of Hate, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2009, at A17 (same); Anne E.
Kornblut & Krissah Thompson, Race Issue Deflected, Now as in Campaign: Obama Maintains
Criticism Is About Policy Differences, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2009, at A1 (discussing comments of
former President Carter that some opposition to President Obama is racially motivated); cf. Hendrik
Hertzberg, Comment: Lies, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 33 (including race among factors motivat-
ing paranoia generated by Obama and his programs).
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that reform proposals would be defeated.103
If you are white, and you have any lingering doubts about the existence of
embedded racial inequalities in the culture, simply ask yourself whether you
would mind waking up tomorrow morning as a member of a racial minority
group. If the culture has truly freed itself from the influence of embedded racial
inequalities, you should be largely indifferent about the race that you will
become overnight. But I suspect that most whites are not indifferent. Indeed,
one informal survey showed that white college students thought that they would
be entitled to $1 million in damages per year if they were suddenly transformed
from white into black.104
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of the subtle and often
unconscious forms of pervasive racial discrimination that continue to exist in
the culture, referring to them as “societal discrimination.”105 But rather than
make any effort to remedy those pervasive forms of discrimination, the affirma-
tive action decisions handed down by the Court’s conservative bloc have instead
held that such societal discrimination is simply beyond the reach of permissible
race-conscious remedies.106 Moreover, the Court has held that voluntary efforts
by the white majority to eliminate societal discrimination through the use of
such remedies are themselves unconstitutional denials of the equal protection
rights of whites.107
This is significant because race-conscious remedies often provide the only
realistic method of neutralizing the effects of entrenched past discrimination.108
Nevertheless, the Court has limited the use of race-conscious remedies to
identifiable acts of past discrimination for which the defendant, rather than
some societal norm, is responsible.109 As a corollary, it has also prohibited the
103. See Krissah Thompson, Minority Groups Raise Voices on Reform: Advocates Still Wary of
Making Race a Central Issue in Health Care Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2009, at A9 (discussing
participation of minorities in health care debate).
104. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 43–44
(2003) (describing survey). See generally id. passim (describing many ways in which blacks and whites
continue to live in two different worlds, where blacks are treated as inferior to whites).
105. See infra note 107 (citing “societal discrimination” cases).
106. See infra note 107.
107. This position was articulated by Justice Powell in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–10 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274–79 (1986) (plurality opinion). Lead by Justice O’Connor, this view has
since been adopted by a majority of the full Supreme Court. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
323–25 (2003) (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination); id. at 330
(rejecting racial balancing as “patently unconstitutional”); see also Metro Broad. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S.
547, 612–14 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
494–96 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting societal discrimination); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 647–53 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (same); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288
(O’Connor, J. concurring) (same). Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts reiterated this view in the 2007
Resegregation Cases. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
732–33 (2007) (plurality opinion) (same).
108. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 848, 850–52 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
race-neutral efforts had failed to prevent school resegregation).
109. See supra note 107.
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use of quotas or numerical guidelines to promote racial balance.110 Stated
differently, the Court has permitted remedies for the identifiable acts of discrimi-
nation that now cause marginal problems, but it has prohibited remedies for the
embedded inequalities that cause the major problem of keeping racial minorities
in a subordinate position through the modern version of white supremacy.
Stated even more starkly, the Supreme Court has read the Constitution to
protect, rather than prohibit, subtle and pervasive forms of societal discrimina-
tion.
The power of embedded societal discrimination—and the Supreme Court’s
own implication in the perpetuation of that discrimination—is illustrated by the
Ricci case itself. The Ricci Court required New Haven to utilize the racially
disparate results of a standardized firefighter promotion exam that had never
been validated to establish the exam’s job-related business necessity.111 More-
over, it did so even though alternatives existed that were more job related, and
had less disparate impact, than the standardized test.112 The Court knew only
two things about the firefighter promotion exam that it required the city to use.
It knew that the validity of the exam had been vigorously contested in the
record, and it knew that whites typically outperformed racial minorities on such
standardized tests.113 Nevertheless, the Court still chose to adopt performance
on the exam as a baseline for promotion, any deviation from which would be
viewed as racial discrimination against whites.114 The Court never explained
why it chose to accord such dispositive deference to an exam whose validity
was disputed, if not thoroughly discredited. But I have my suspicions.
The reason that the Ricci Court displayed such unquestioning deference to the
standardized promotion exam is precisely because whites outperform minorities
on standardized tests. I am not suggesting that the Court conspiratorially chose
to utilize an invalid selection criterion in order to favor white firefighters over
minority firefighters. I am suggesting something much more troubling. I am
suggesting that—despite a mass of contrary evidence—the Court actually be-
lieved the standardized test to be valid because the results of that test corre-
sponded to the racially-correlated expectations that the culture had taught the
Justices equate with merit. Because whites outperformed minorities on the
exam, the exam must have been measuring qualities that were relevant to
merit-based promotions. Therefore, any decision not to certify the results of that
exam must have been rooted in a desire to abandon merit in favor of unwar-
ranted racial affirmative action. As a structural matter, the belief that whites are
110. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732–33 (plurality opinion) (prohibiting racial balance);
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (requiring particularized remedies).
111. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
112. See id. at 2705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing alternative of using assessment centers or
different test weightings).
113. See id. (discussing alternatives); id. at 2668–69 (majority opinion) (discussing evidence that
whites outperform minorities on standardized tests).
114. See id. at 2681.
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better than racial minorities is so deeply embedded in our unstated cultural
expectations that the belief can exert influence in ways that do not even rise to
the level of conscious awareness. This insight constitutes one of the core tenets
of Critical Race Theory.115
If racial minorities who were not themselves the products of white accultura-
tion had written the New Haven firefighters exam, I suspect that racial minori-
ties would have outperformed whites. Minority firefighters would have found it
easier than white firefighters to understand and relate to the subtle linguistic
cues and cultural values that necessarily would have been reflected in the exam.
However, similar cultural biases undoubtedly made it easier for white firefight-
ers than minority firefighters to understand and relate to the subtle linguistic
cues and cultural values that were necessarily reflected in the firefighters exam
that New Haven actually administered. One might be tempted to argue that
there is no reason to believe that an exam written by racial minorities, on which
racial minorities outperformed whites, should be viewed as a valid test of
job-related skills—let alone a test that should be dispositive in making fire-
fighter promotions. But that is the point. There is also no reason to believe that
an exam written by whites, on which whites outperformed racial minorities,
should be viewed as a valid test of job-related skills—let alone a test that should
be dispositive in making firefighter promotions.
The only reason that the Ricci Court was willing to disregard conflicting
evidence, and view the non-validated New Haven exam as establishing the
appropriate baseline for firefighter promotions, is that whites performed in the
way that the Court expected. If racial minorities had outperformed whites in the
face of conflicting evidence concerning the exam’s validity, the Court would
almost certainly have viewed the exam results as suspect. Racial expectations
are so firmly embedded in United States culture that reversing the races would
have been dispositive. And white privilege is so firmly embedded that ignoring
a resource allocation scheme that has historically favored whites now consti-
tutes an act of racial discrimination against whites.
Ricci is instructive for one additional reason. Even when the political branches
of government achieve some success in resisting the constitutive influence of
race in contemporary culture—as Congress arguably did when it adopted the
disparate impact provision of Title VII—the interests of racial minorities may
still end up being overridden by the interests of whites. That is because the
Supreme Court retains the last clear chance to ensure that white interests can
ultimately prevail—a function that the Court has historically been very adept at
115. See, e.g., CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 10, at xxv (discussing structural nature of discrimina-
tion); SPANN supra note 11, at 60–66 (deconstructing distinction between intent and effects standards
for discrimination); Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1449, 1496–1501 (1997) (illustrating ways to invert distinction between bias and merit in
affirmative action debate).
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performing.116 The Court can always invalidate representative branch actions on
constitutional grounds, as it often does in racial affirmative action cases.117 Or it
can threaten invalidation in the process of imposing a narrow construction on
representative branch actions, as it did in Ricci.118 Indeed, one of the interesting
features of separation of powers doctrine is that there always seems to be at
least one branch of government that can ensure the protection of white majority
interests when the need arises. Accordingly, some sort of precommitment
strategy would seem to offer the most realistic hope of ever escaping our
cultural inclination to engage in societal discrimination. And the recognition of
disparate impact claims may offer one of the most promising precommitment
strategies that are available.
B. APPROXIMATE EQUALITY
The goal of race neutrality is realistically unattainable in a culture where race
is as salient as it has always been in the United States. Race is too deeply
embedded in our unconscious motivations simply to be rendered irrelevant by
conscious efforts to adhere to a race-neutral intent in the way that we allocate
resources. Instead, what passes for colorblind race neutrality is typically just a
camouflaged effort to prolong the racial status quo, under which benefits are
disproportionately allocated to whites and burdens are disproportionately allo-
cated to racial minorities. Regardless of the degree of sincerity that we bring to
the mission, history—and our current maldistribution of resources—indicate
that we will never be able to achieve meaningful racial equality simply through
an act of will. We do, however, have it within our power to precommit ourselves
to constraints on our collective behavior that will enable us to approximate the
equality in resource allocation that our embedded racial attitudes apparently
preclude us from achieving through mere conscious efforts to suppress our
discriminatory impulses. In fact, cognitive dissonance theory predicts that by
forcing our behavior to correspond to our aspirational equality values, our
embedded racial attitudes may ultimately evolve to conform to our behavior as
well.119
In a truly race neutral society, resources would be allocated in a way that
reflected the racial balance of the society as a whole. Whites and racial
minorities would share the benefits and burdens of society in a way that
reflected their respective percentages of the population. Occupations such as
116. See supra text accompanying notes 11–22 (describing illustrative cases); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711, 722 (2007) (plurality opinion)
(permitting resegregation of public schools); id. at 745–48 (citing Brown II as authorizing resegrega-
tion).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 77–83 (discussing affirmative action cases).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 70–76 (discussing tacit threat and narrow construction in
Ricci).
119. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–31 (1957) (describing
cognitive dissonance theory).
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corporate executive, domestic worker, and farm laborer would not be stereo-
typed by the racial correlates of their practitioners. Election to Congress and the
White House would not overwhelmingly be bestowed on the members of a
single race. And wealth, education, and social status would just as likely be
found in one racial group as in another. Individual differences in merit, talent, or
aptitude would continue to exist, but there is no reason to suspect that those
differences would in any way correlate with the race of the individuals in whom
they were observed. Indeed, such a suspicion would necessarily rest on a belief
in inherent racial attributes that would, of course, contradict the aspirational
starting assumption of race neutrality on which this thought experiment is
based. Such a vision is presently too utopian to be realistically imagined. But it
does serve to remind us that a culture in which there was genuine racial equality
would look very different from the culture in which we presently reside.120
Although it is difficult to see how we could ever transform ourselves into a
culture from which racial discrimination had finally been eradicated, it is
relatively easy to see how we could begin to approximate the allocation of
resources that such a culture would contain.
The disparate impact provision of Title VII constitutes a promising precommit-
ment strategy that would hopefully help us achieve more racial equality than
our embedded racial habits and attitudes would allow if left to their own
devices. By explicitly reaffirming the value of a disparate impact provision in
Title VII, Congress apparently appreciated the importance of adopting an
antidiscrimination strategy that focused on statistical effects rather than on mere
invidious intent.121 Congress apparently recognized that this focus on disparate
impact was a necessary step in its effort to displace the continuing effects of
entrenched white advantage in employment. And even the then-conservative
Burger Supreme Court recognized this when it implied the existence of a
disparate impact provision in Griggs.122 The fact that subsequent Supreme
Courts have chosen to back away from disparate impact under the Constitu-
tion,123 and now under Title VII,124 does not mean that the precommitment
strategy adopted by Congress has ceased to be a good strategy. On the contrary,
it may show that the strategy is so good that the Court feared it would produce
120. A slightly more developed musing on this utopian race-neutral society is contained in Gi-
rardeau Spann, Just Do It, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 16–21 (2004).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60 (discussing inclusion of Title VII disparate impact
provision in Civil Rights Act of 1991).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58 (discussing implied disparate impact provision in
Griggs). Subsequent race decisions by the more conservative Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have now
made the Burger Court seem more moderate. See, e.g., SPANN, supra note 32, at 161–63 (discussing
votes of Supreme Court Justices in race cases).
123. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) (adopting intentional discrimination
standard).
124. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65, 2672–77 (2009) (subordinating disparate-
impact provision to intentional discrimination provision of Title VII).
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more racial equality than the conservative bloc was willing to bear.125
Precommiting ourselves to the recognition of disparate impact claims would
have at least three distinct equality benefits. First, it would promote a more
racially balanced allocation of societal resources. Second, it would advance
what Richard Primus has emphasized is a second-order concern with the
expressive function of antidiscrimination law by prompting us to adopt a more
mature understanding of the equal protection principle.126 Third, it would apply
to the problem of racial discrimination the idea of “asymmetric precommit-
ment” that Richard Lazarus has applied to the problem of climate change in the
context of environmental law.127 These three benefits might then remind the
Supreme Court that it could use disparate impact theory to approximate genuine
equality in much the same way that it arguably uses representation-reinforce-
ment theory to approximate genuine democracy.
The recognition of disparate impact claims would redistribute societal re-
sources in a way that is racially more equitable. For example, under the facts of
Ricci, recognition of disparate impact considerations would have permitted a
significant number of firefighter promotions to go to racial minorities, whereas
the Court’s rejection of disparate impact considerations meant that the promo-
tions went overwhelmingly to whites.128 Although the explicit white supremacy
and de jure discrimination that characterized the eras of slavery and Jim Crow
segregation may now have been reduced,129 the facially neutral discriminations
that are an everyday product of our normal cultural practices still have a racially
disparate impact that remains potent and persistent.130 Accordingly, it is difficult
to see how the habit of white privilege—which has been solidified by a long and
insistent history of racial discrimination—can ever be reversed without attack-
ing the problem of disparate impact directly. A precommitment to disparate
effects will help override the allocative discrimination that has been perpetuated
by our current focus on discriminatory intent.
However, even if Washington v. Davis were overruled—and the Title VII
disparate impact cause of action were applied more generally to all discrimina-
tion cases, rather than merely to cases involving employment discrimination—
allocative equality would not necessarily ensue. As Ricci itself illustrates, ample
125. Recall that members of the Court’s conservative-voting bloc have virtually always voted
against racial minorities in constitutional affirmative action, redistricting, and school desegregation
cases. See supra text accompanying note 34 (discussing conservative-voting bloc).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 133–138 (discussing expressive function).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 139–141 (discussing asymmetric precommitment).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65 (describing Ricci holding).
129. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV & XV (abolishing slavery, granting citizenship and
certain civil rights to newly freed black slaves, and granting right to vote to newly freed black slaves);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (invalidating de jure school segregation); see
generally STONE ET AL., supra note 19, at 441–88 (discussing evolution of laws protecting racial
minorities).
130. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299–304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing striking racial disparities that continue to exist in distribution of societal resources).
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doctrinal means are available for the perpetuation of allocative inequality by a
Supreme Court that is intent on blunting the thrust of a disparate impact cause
of action. Not only is the Court free to manipulate the factors of job-related
business necessity and less discriminatory alternatives, but it can always find
that other competing interests outweigh the societal interest in avoiding dispar-
ate impact.131 The Court can even manipulate levels of generality to expand or
contract the minority populations that count for purposes of assessing disparate
impact.132 Accordingly, the recognition of disparate impact claims will operate
as a successful precommitment strategy only if it is accompanied by a genuine
commitment to that strategy.
Richard Primus has written an important article about the interaction between
the equal protection guarantee and disparate impact standards.133 Discussing
potential tensions that exist between the Title VII disparate impact provision
and the Supreme Court’s recent equal protection emphasis on the interests of
whites, Primus believes it is unlikely that statutory disparate impact claims
would actually be held unconstitutional.134 However, he does perceive a danger
that the constitutionality of disparate impact claims might be secured at the cost
of conceptualizing those claims in a diluted way that deprives them of their full
potential to promote racial equality.135
For Primus, the second order expressive value that can be derived from
disparate impact claims lies precisely in the ability of those claims to remind us
that present allocative inequalities are the result of enduring, hierarchical group-
based historical discriminations that cannot adequately be redressed through a
conception of discrimination as an individualized phenomenon.136 Accordingly,
the dynamic interaction that can exist between equal protection and disparate
impact has the potential of changing our understanding of equal protection in a
way that reveals the inadequacies of the individualized model.137 Although the
cautionary message contained in the Primus article was published six years
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci, the Ricci majority appears
nevertheless to have adopted the type of diluted disparate impact understanding
131. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65 (describing Ricci holding).
132. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 498–508 (1989) (discussing
inadequacy of statistical evidence to establish history of discrimination in construction trades in
Richmond, Virginia).
133. See Primus, supra note 59.
134. See id. at 495. But see Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009) (case decided after
Primus article was written, expressly reserving question of constitutionality of Title VII disparate-
impact provision); id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that Title VII disparate impact
provision is unconstitutional).
135. See Primus, supra note 59, at 494–502 (discussing tension between equal protection and
disparate impact).
136. See id. at 553–66 (discussing individualized and group conceptions of discrimination).
137. See id. at 566–85 (discussing effect of expressive harm on our understanding of equality).
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of individualized discrimination that Primus feared.138
A more mature conceptual understanding of equality would, of course, pay
attention to the historical persistence of our embedded cultural attitudes and
behaviors, rather than simply dismissing those attitudes and behaviors as mere
reflections of societal discrimination that lie beyond the reach of legal recogni-
tion. Richard Lazarus has suggested a way in which we can resist our normal
tendency to engage in presently-appealing behavior that, in fact, undermines our
long-term objectives. Lazarus notes that the enactment, implementation, and
funding of environmental protection measures that address the problem of
long-term climate change are often frustrated by the more immediate economic
concerns that special interests typically advance at various stages of the regula-
tory process. However, Lazarus argues that we can resist such predictable
impediments to our long-term interests by adopting what he terms “asymmetric
precommitment” strategies.139
These strategies include institutional design features that make it easier to
implement future regulatory modifications when those modifications are likely
to advance our climate change objectives, but make it more difficult to imple-
ment future modifications when they are likely to undermine those objectives.
In the environmental context, such design features could include things like:
supermajority requirements, multinational agreements, legislative appropriation
restrictions, targeted funding mechanisms to compete with special interest
funding, targeted canons of statutory and regulatory construction, expert consul-
tation requirements, participatory rights for stakeholders, and targeted time
restrictions.140 In responding to the argument that precommitment strategies are
undesirable because they improperly permit policymakers in the present to bind
hypothetical policymakers of the future, Lazarus argues that such precommit-
ment in the context of climate change actually makes it possible for hypotheti-
cal policymakers of the future to bind policymakers of the present.141
By utilizing the Lazarus idea of asymmetric precommitment to conceptualize
the phenomenon of racially disparate impact, I believe that it is possible to
capture the expressive benefits of disparate impact claims that Primus believes
can move us to a more mature understanding of the equal protection principle.
As Ricci illustrates, the primary objection to disparate impact claims that is
asserted by racial minorities is that the recognition of those claims can be
viewed as entailing intentional racial discrimination against whites.142 That
138. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65 (describing Ricci elevation of individualized white
interest to avoid intentional discrimination over group interests of racial minorities in avoiding
disparate impact discrimination).
139. See Lazarus, supra note 89, at 1158–59, 1193–1204 (discussing asymmetric precommitment).
140. See id. at 1205–31 (describing potential institutional design features).
141. See id. at 1204–05 (discussing how asymmetric precommitment permits future to govern
present).
142. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (holding that desire to prevent disparate
impact entailed intentional discrimination against whites).
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objection, however, rests on the view that whites and racial minorities are
similarly situated with respect to a societal resource before its allocation. As a
result, taking the resource away from a white applicant simply to prevent
racially disparate impact is unfair to the white applicant, whose superior exam
performance has created an entitlement to the resource. However, analogizing
the Lazarus environmental insight to the issue of race, it becomes apparent that
whites and racial minorities are not similarly situated with respect to the
unallocated resource.
Just as a preoccupation with immediate economic gain can obscure long-term
environmental concerns, a preoccupation with firefighter exam results can
obscure the discrimination against racial minorities that is embedded in the use
of non-validated promotion exams on which whites perform better than racial
minorities. Accordingly, the recognition of disparate impact claims is not a
discriminatory deviation from exam-based neutrality at all. Rather, it is an
asymmetric precommitment strategy designed to compensate for our predictable
cultural inclination to utilize selection criteria that mask an often unrecognized
submission to the lure of white privilege. Just as asymmetric environmental
precommitment can permit a hypothetical future to bind an existing present, the
asymmetric precommitment of disparate impact recognition can permit a hypo-
thetical nondiscriminatory future to bind an existing discriminatory present.
The dynamic relationship between disparate impact and equal protection that
is revealed through this understanding of asymmetric precommitment consti-
tutes the sort of expressive benefit that Primus believes can lead us to a more
sophisticated and mature understanding of the concept of equality. It can, for
example, help us to understand that contemporary claims of post-racialism do
not reflect the absence of continuing discrimination, but rather constitute a
modern strategy for engaging in a continued form of racial discrimination that is
the contemporary analog to old-fashioned discrimination. If the current Su-
preme Court conservative bloc majority were to share this more fully developed
understanding of the relationship between disparate impact and actual equality,
it would be in a position to advance, rather than frustrate, our stated aspirational
effort to achieve racial equality.
It is difficult to know precisely what a nondiscriminatory society would look
like. But it certainly seems sensible to suppose that it would be free from the
rampant disparate impact that continues to characterize our supposedly post-
racial, current society. When the Supreme Court engages in representation-
reinforcement judicial review, it tries to approximate the results that would be
produced by a properly functioning democratic process that is not distorted by
the influence of invidious discrimination against discrete and insular minori-
ties.143 The attempt to approximate the features of a hypothetical counterfactual
culture can often be a perilous undertaking. But a racially balanced allocation of
143. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that white
majority might choose to impose burdens on politically underrepresented discrete and insular minori-
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significant societal resources would seem to be as constitutive of such a
nondiscriminatory culture as the racially imbalanced allocation of resources
appears to be constitutive of the culture in which we now reside. The elimina-
tion of identifiable disparate impact seems like such a modest step toward the
realization of meaningful racial equality that it is difficult to understand why a
Supreme Court committed to the goal of genuine equality would ever resist the
chance to remedy disparate impact. But perhaps it is the issue of genuine
commitment that is causing the problem.
CONCLUSION
Race is so deeply embedded in the fabric of the United States that racial discrimina-
tion is simply a constitutive aspect of the culture. Nevertheless, the United
States did recently elect Barack Obama as its first black President. Despite
contrary suggestions, however, that does not mean that the United States has
now evolved to a post-racial stage of development in which the problems of
racial discrimination have largely been relegated to the past. Rather, it means
that the United States has now evolved to a new stage of development in the
sophistication of its techniques for practicing racial discrimination.
Racial discrimination used to be both blatant and explicitly rooted in the
doctrine of white supremacy. But post-racial discrimination is now more subtly
rooted in the very doctrine of racial equality itself. The discriminatory alloca-
tion of benefits and burdens, to which United States culture has always been
committed, has now simply been folded into the baseline allocation of resources
that we treat as the neutral starting point for assessing the racial legitimacy of
any reallocation regime. And redistributive efforts to upset that baseline by
diverting resources from whites to racial minorities can now be viewed as
entailing reverse discrimination against whites. This form of post-racial discrimi-
nation has been developing over the last few decades, but the election of
President Obama seems to have given the technique more widespread appeal
than it has previously been able to command. That makes post-racial discrimina-
tion particularly dangerous because both the perpetrators and victims may come
to view the practice as morally and legally legitimate.
Post-racial discrimination permits the ways in which the culture generates
and perpetuates racial differences among its members to be subsumed by the
core concept of racial legitimacy. Historically, the things that we have done to
each other in the name of race always seemed legitimate to the white majority at
the time that they were being done. Seizing Indian lands was legitimate because
conquerors are permitted to keep the spoils of their successful conquests.
Slavery was legitimate because white supremacy made slaves subhuman. De
jure segregation was legitimate because God and nature established intrinsic
ties). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79
(1980) (elaborating representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review).
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differences between the races. Persistent de facto segregation was legitimate,
even after the invalidation of de jure desegregation, because the value we place
on liberal autonomy precluded compelled association. More recently, the invali-
dation of affirmative action and antidiscrimination laws has been deemed
legitimate because our efforts to prevent discrimination against racial minorities
has ended up producing the more serious problem of discrimination against
members of the white majority.
As the culture matures, prior justifications for racial discrimination inevitably
lose their luster and eventually fall out of favor. New justifications must then be
found to take their place. The claim that redistributive efforts to aid racial
minorities actually constitute reverse discrimination against whites appears to
have considerable present appeal. But the plausibility of that claim does depend
upon the belief that there is no longer any significant discrimination against
racial minorities to be remedied. It is this belief that has given rise to the claim
that we now live in a post-racial culture. And it is this pursuit of racial
“equality” for whites that has elevated post-racialism into our presently pre-
ferred form of discrimination against racial minorities.
Our collective predisposition to sacrifice the interests of racial minorities for
the interests of whites seems to be firmly embedded in our cultural attitudes and
values. Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine how our inclination to engage in
racial discrimination can ever be overcome without adopting some sort of
precommitment strategy that forces us to engage in the behavior that would be
produced by racial equality even if we do not yet have the capacity to assimilate
the values of racial equality. Recognizing the moral and legal legitimacy of
disparate impact discrimination might well serve as such a precommitment
strategy. By forcing ourselves to allocate societal resources in a way that
approximates the resource allocation that would exist in a race-neutral culture,
we might be able to escape the gravitational pull of our embedded racial
attitudes. Congress appears to have adopted a version of this precommitment
strategy in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
However, the Supreme Court has not only refused to recognize the legitimacy
of disparate impact claims for constitutional purposes, but its recent Ricci
decision seems intent on nullifying congressional disparate impact claims for
statutory purposes as well. Because it is difficult to imagine a non-invidious
explanation for the Court’s resistance to such a seemingly sensible precommit-
ment strategy, one cannot help but marvel at the genius of the regime that the
culture has created for ensuring the preservation of white privilege. Although
the institution of judicial review is sometimes viewed as reflecting an effort to
ensure that our transitory baser motives are not permitted to override the more
admirable values that are possessed by our better selves, in the context of race
the Supreme Court appears to be serving precisely the opposite function. The
Supreme Court seems to be the structural institution on which we rely to ensure that
our transitory desires to promote racial equality are not permitted to override the
less admirable value of white privilege that is possessed by our baser selves.
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